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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 14-3794 
________________ 
 
 
In re:  RADNOR HOLDINGS CORPORATION, et al. 
        Debtors 
 
      MICHAEL T. KENNEDY, 
        Appellant 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-13-cv-01398) 
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 19, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, NYGAARD, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 10, 2015) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Radnor Holdings Corporation filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2006.  
The Bankruptcy Court authorized Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP to serve 
as bankruptcy counsel and approved Skadden’s final fee application in June 2013.  
Michael Kennedy had filed objections to the final fee application and appealed to the 
District Court.  It affirmed the decision of the Bankruptcy Court and Kennedy has 
appealed pro se the District Court’s order.1  We affirm.   
I. 
 After filing for bankruptcy, Radnor applied to the Bankruptcy Court for an order 
authorizing it to retain Skadden.  The United States Trustee objected because Skadden 
had disclosed that it represented Tennenbaum Capital Partners LLC in unrelated matters.  
At the time, Tennenbaum owned stock in Radnor and controlled one of Radnor’s four 
board seats.  In September 2006, the Bankruptcy Court conducted a hearing and entered 
an order approving Skadden’s application.  Based on Skadden’s disclosures, the Court 
concluded that Tennenbaum was not a significant client and that Skadden’s relationship 
with it was not a disabling conflict of interest.  Shortly thereafter, Tennenbaum purchased 
all of Radnor’s stock and assets through a bankruptcy sale after attempts at a restructuring 
proved unsuccessful.   
 Fast forward to November 2012, when Skadden filed its final fee application.  
Kennedy (then represented by counsel) filed written objections.  After a two-day 
evidentiary hearing and post-hearing briefing, the Bankruptcy Court overruled Kennedy’s 
objections and approved the fee application.   
                                              
1 Kennedy was a lawyer and member of the Pennsylvania bar from 1998 to 2003.   
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 On appeal by Kennedy, the District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s 
decision.  He now appeals to us.2     
II. 
 “Our review of the District Court’s decision effectively amounts to review of the 
[B]ankruptcy [C]ourt’s opinion in the first instance.”  In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of 
Delaware, 298 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2002).  We review the latter’s factual findings for 
clear error, any questions of law de novo, and the approval of the fee application for 
abuse of discretion.  Zolfo, Cooper & Co. v. Sunbeam-Oster Co., 50 F.3d 253, 257 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  
III. 
 Kennedy argues that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in granting the fee 
application because Skadden’s pre-retention disclosures failed to comply with 
Bankruptcy Rule 2014.  Under that Rule, a debtor’s application to employ an attorney 
shall state, “to the best of the applicant’s knowledge,” the attorney’s “connections with 
the debtor, creditors, [and] any other party in interest.”  Fed. R. Bank. P. 2014.  Kennedy 
alleges that Skadden failed to disclose in its application to the Bankruptcy Court certain 
investments in Tennenbaum and its affiliates.  The Bankruptcy Court disagreed.  After 
reviewing all the evidence and conducting an in-person hearing, it found that Skadden 
had not misrepresented its relationship with Tennenbaum.  Kennedy has not shown that 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over the final order of the Bankruptcy Court under 
28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  We have jurisdiction over the District Court’s order per 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d).   
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this finding was clearly erroneous and, absent any violation of Rule 2014, the Bankruptcy 
Court did not abuse its discretion in approving the fee application.    
 Kennedy also contends that Bankruptcy Court erred in 2006 in approving Skadden 
as bankruptcy counsel because it was not disinterested, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 327.  
But any challenge to the Bankruptcy Court’s initial approval of Skadden is not properly 
before us because Kennedy never appealed the retention order or previously identified the 
order as an issue for this appeal.   Shareholders v. Sound Radio, Inc., 109 F.3d 873, 879 
(3d Cir. 1997) (“The failure to file a timely notice of appeal creates a jurisdictional defect 
barring appellate review.”); F/S Airlease II, Inc. v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 
1988) (holding Bankruptcy Court order approving retention of a law firm retroactively 
was appealable order).  Kennedy asserts that we have jurisdiction because the Bankruptcy 
Court “reaffirmed” the 2006 order in 2013 when it approved the final fee application.  
Nowhere in the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion, however, did it purport to reaffirm an earlier 
order.    
 Kennedy next claims that the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings in its 2013 
opinion were clearly erroneous because it failed to consider evidence of Skadden’s 
willful misconduct.  This is incorrect.  The Bankruptcy Court noted that it had considered 
the entire record before approving the fee application, and Kennedy is unable to identify 
any particular evidence that was omitted.  In effect, he is arguing that the Bankruptcy 
Court did not construe the evidence in order to reach his desired conclusions.  This is not 
a ground for reversal.  In re Myers, 491 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The [B]ankruptcy 
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[C]ourt is best positioned to assess the facts, particularly those related to 
credibility . . . .”).    
 Finally, Kennedy argues that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to vacate the sale and confirmation orders entered in Radnor’s 
bankruptcy.  The Court denied the motion as time-barred in April 2013 and Kennedy 
never appealed the order or raised this issue for appeal.  Accordingly, any challenge to 
that denial is not properly before us.  Shareholders, 109 F.3d at 879.   
* *  *  *  * 
 We thus affirm the decision of the District Court affirming the ruling of the 
Bankruptcy Court.  
 
